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f the bullionist writers who advocated restoration of the gold con-
vertibility of England’s currency during the Bank Restriction period
1797–1821, few are as little known today as John Wheatley. Certainly
his name is not as familiar as those of David Ricardo, Henry Thornton, Thomas
Malthus, Francis Horner, William Huskisson, and other bullionists. Yet in some
respects he was the most original of the group. His Essay on the Theory of
Money and Principles of Commerce (1807) spelled out the logic and implica-
tions of the strict bullionist position more forcefully and systematically than any
document before Ricardo’s High Price of Bullion: A Proof of the Depreciation
of Bank Notes (1810).
To Wheatley belongs much of the credit for expounding at least four
hard-line bullionist propositions often attributed to Ricardo. First, money-stock
changes have no effect on output and employment. Second, exchange rate de-
preciations, a high price of gold, and specie drains stem solely from an excess
issue of currency. Third, being purely monetary phenomena, exchange rate
changes, gold price movements, and specie drains are immune to real shocks
operating through the balance of payments. Fourth, exchange rate depreciation
and the excess of market over mint price of gold constitute proof and measure
of overissue in inconvertible paper regimes. To these can be added a ﬁfth con-
tribution: his demonstration that monetary expansion and price inﬂation can
continue indeﬁnitely on a given gold base if all countries expand in step.
Wheatley derived these propositions from an analytical model character-
ized by sharp dichotomization of real and monetary sectors. He sought to show
that monetary shocks do not affect real variables nor real shocks monetary
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variables. To do so, he partitioned his real and monetary variables into separate
compartments and allowed little or no interaction between the two. Neutrality,
block exogeneity, and absence of reverse causality—these were the hallmarks
of his analysis. They allowed him to contend that his monetary indicators were
uncontaminated by real disturbances. As such, they signaled overissue pure and
simple and so constituted an unambiguous measure of the need for monetary
contraction to correct the excess issue. More than most economists before or
since, he took the extreme position that monetary shocks affect only monetary
variables and real shocks real variables.1
Despite Wheatley’s originality, his work has suffered from neglect. Ignored
in his own time because of a labored, archaic expository style and a hypercriti-
cal, vitriolic attitude toward his fellow economists, he has also been underrated
in ours.2 Modern commentators, when they mention him at all, typically focus
exclusively on certain striking aspects of his work rather than on his complete
analytical model. Thus Schumpeter (1954) concentrates on his crude version of
the quantity theory of money. Einzig (1962), Frenkel (1978), Ofﬁcer (1984), and
Wu (1939) emphasize his purchasing power parity doctrine. Fetter (1942) and
Viner (1937) spotlight his assumption of price and exchange rate invariance to
real shocks. Metzler (1948), Morgan (1943), O’Brien (1975), and Viner (1937)
accent his income-expenditure theory of unilateral transfers. Chipman (1983)
criticizes his theory of gold price determination. None, however, mention his
integration of these elements into a consistent theory of how an open economy
responds to real and monetary disturbances.
The result is a gap in our knowledge of Wheatley’s theory of the inter-
national adjustment mechanism. This gap is all the more regrettable because
it contributes to the notion of a monolithic classical theory based on David
Hume’s account of the price-specie-ﬂow mechanism. In fact, Wheatley’s
theory differs from Hume’s. It emphasizes continuous purchasing power parity,
gold market arbitrage, and unilateral payments accomplished through income
changes rather than through price adjustments. It demonstrates that there is
more than one classical theory of the international mechanism.
This article represents an effort to ﬁll the gap and to give Wheatley his
due. First, it speciﬁes the basic building blocks of Wheatley’s model. Second,
it shows how he used these components to explain international adjustment to
monetary disturbances under convertible and inconvertible currency regimes.
Third, it shows how he modiﬁed his model to handle real disturbances and in
so doing contributed to the theory of international transfers. Fourth, it outlines
1 Wheatley’s strong real-nominal dichotomy has its closest modern counterpart in the work
of the contemporary real business cycle school founded by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long
and Plosser (1983).
2 On Wheatley’s expository style and attitude toward his fellow economists, see Chipman
(1983), pp. 7 and 49–50, and Hollander (1911), p. 464.       
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some policy implications of his analysis. Last, it evaluates his place in classical
monetary thought.
1. BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS
The ﬁrst task is to sketch the chief components of Wheatley’s model. These
consist of (1) the quantity theory of money, (2) the purchasing power parity
doctrine, and (3) a theory of gold arbitrage. Together, they trace out a causal
chain in which money determines prices, prices determine exchange rates, and
exchange rate movements trigger specie drains under metallic and convertible
currency regimes and currency depreciation under inconvertible paper regimes.
Of the three components, the quantity theory employs closed-economy propo-
sitions; the parity and arbitrage doctrines, open-economy ones.
Quantity Theory
Wheatley adheres to a particularly strict or rigid version of the quantity theory.
This version embodies the notions of (1) proportionality of money and prices,
(2) money-to-price causality, (3) neutrality of money, (4) monetary rather than
real theory of prices, and (5) exogeneity of the nominal stock of money.
On the proportionality postulate, Wheatley (1807) declares that “all prices
are in proportion to the quantity of money.” “This principle,” he writes, “appears
so obvious, that it would be superﬂuous to enter into the proof of its validity;
and I shall assume it as a postulate that would be universally conceded” (p.
12). In symbols, P = kM, where P is the home country’s price level, M is its
money stock, and k is a constant coefﬁcient equal to the ratio of the circulation
velocity of money to real output—both variables (velocity and output) treated
as ﬁxed constants by Wheatley. A similar equation holds for the foreign
country in Wheatley’s two-country model. That is, P∗=k∗M∗, where the aster-
isks denote foreign country variables. Thus, “if the currency of one country is
relatively greater than the currency of another, its price will be proportionally
higher” (1819, p. 24), or P/P∗ = K(M/M∗), where K is the ratio of the constants
k and k∗.
As for the notion of money-to-price causality, Wheatley endorses it in no
uncertain terms. “Prices,” he says, “are determined by the quantity of money”
(1819, p. 24). Thus a money-stock expansion has “no other operation than to
raise the price of produce” (1807, p. 38). It “has no other effect than to cause
its own depression” in purchasing power 1/P (p. 37). In his view, money drives
prices through a direct expenditure mechanism. A monetary expansion raises
the ratio of cash to nominal transactions above the fraction people desire to
hold. Cash holders spend the excess money immediately and mechanically in
an effort to work off the unwanted balances. The increased spending raises
prices and the volume of nominal transactions. The process ends when the
desired cash ratio is restored and the new money is willingly held.  
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Having asserted direct causality, he implicitly rejects the notion of reverse
causality running from prices to money. Reverse causality might arise in metal-
lic currency regimes if an exogenous fall in the price level, by raising the goods
value of gold, induces an increase in the supply of specie ﬂowing either from
the mines or from abroad through the balance of payments. It also might arise in
a ﬁat paper regime if the central bank validates exogenous price increases with
monetary expansion. Wheatley, however, says nothing about such mechanisms.
He does, however, expand at length on the quantity theory’s neutrality
proposition. He argues that money-stock changes exert no inﬂuence, temporary
or permanent, on real output and employment. Perfect wage-price ﬂexibility,
he claims, ensures as much. Such ﬂexibility means that nominal wages and
prices adjust instantaneously and equiproportionally to monetary shocks. The
result is that the real wage rate and thus the output and employment variables
it determines are invariant to such shocks. Thus, contrary to the popular notion
that “an increase of currency gives a stimulus to industry by the elevation
of prices,” the truth is that “no greater stimulus can in reality exist” (1807,
p. 40). For “the wages of labour are augmented only in proportion to the
increase [of money and prices], and purchase no greater quantity of produce
after the addition than before it” (p. 40). Wheatley concludes: “[A]n increase of
money . . . has no effect like an increase of produce to augment the wealth of
a nation” (p. 37). It has “no other operation than to raise the price of produce,
and augment the nominal incomes of all, without making any addition to their
real opulence” (1807, p. 38). One can hardly ﬁnd a clearer statement of the
neutrality proposition in the entire classical literature.
Wheatley’s neutrality proposition states only that monetary shocks affect
prices and not real variables. It does not deny that real determinants might also
drive the price level. To rule out this possibility, Wheatley asserts that price
changes stem exclusively from monetary rather than real disturbances. “There
is no other cause,” he writes, “than a relative excess of currency which makes
prices higher” (1819, p. 24). True, he notes that real shocks might depress
output and so the demand for money, thereby rendering the existing money
stock excessive. But he argues that any resulting price increase must be attrib-
uted to the monetary excess and not to the real shock. Likewise, he denounces
as “imbecilic” Sir James Steuart’s view that the same real forces of “demand
and competition” that determine relative prices also drive the general price
level (1807, p. ix). Not so, says Wheatley. Money-stock movements govern
the general price level. He also asserts that secular inﬂations emanate from
excessive paper money growth rather than from output contractions and a
shortage of goods.
Finally, Wheatley posits money-stock exogeneity, which he sees as a
corollary of the proposition that money is the independent causal factor govern-
ing prices. He realizes that if money were an endogenous variable responding
passively to prior changes in the economy, he could not claim it plays the      
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active initiating role in raising prices. For this reason, he treats gold coin and
paper notes as exogenous variables emanating autonomously from “the fertility
of mines, and the general publication of state and bank paper” (1807, p. 60).
He ignores the feedback effect of prices on the proﬁtability of mining and the
production of gold. By dismissing such real determinants of commodity money,
he essentially treats it as ﬁat currency.
Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine
The purchasing power parity doctrine forms the second building block in
Wheatley’s model of international adjustment. In what is the clearest and most
complete account of the doctrine before Gustav Cassel’s statement in the 1920s,
he enunciates it in both its absolute and relative versions.
The absolute version says that the exchange rate E—deﬁned as the domes-
tic currency price of a unit of foreign currency—equals the ratio of domestic
to foreign general price levels. This condition renders the purchasing power
of money expressed in terms of a single currency everywhere the same. In
symbols, E = P/P∗ or, equivalently, P = EP∗. As Wheatley (1807) puts it,
“the course of exchange is exclusively governed by the relative state of prices,
or the relative value of money, in the different countries between whom it is
negotiated” (p. 85). It “approximates the price of their produce to a general
level” (p. 45). He sees price-level parity P = EP∗ as emanating from the law
of one price. That law, of course, states that abstracting from tariffs, transport
costs, and other impediments to trade, the price of any given traded good is
the same in all locations when quoted in the same currency. Since Wheatley
assumes that all goods are traded and that identical commodities bear the same
weight in each country’s price index and product mix, he essentially treats
them as a single composite commodity. In his composite-commodity model,
the law of one price applies to aggregate price levels as well as to the prices
of individual goods. Therefore, the real exchange rate, or commodity terms of
trade, between two nations equals unity, or EP∗/P = 1. In Wheatley’s words,
“the state of exchange must uniformly coincide with the state of prices, or
the interchange of produce could not be transacted on equal terms” (1819,
p. 21). A unitary value of the terms of trade permits “any given quantity” of
the composite commodity to “exchange for the same value in every part of the
world” (1807, p. 46).
He gives an equally lucid statement of the doctrine’s relative version, ac-
cording to which the percentage change of the exchange rate is the differential
between the percentage changes of the price levels. “The exchange between
London and Hamburgh,” he says, “is at any given moment ﬁve percent against
London, only because the general prices at Hamburgh are at that time ﬁve
percent lower than the general prices of London” (1807, p. 63). Here is his        
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description of the relationship e = p − p∗, where the lowercase letters denote
percentage changes in their uppercase counterparts.
Wheatley saw the parity doctrine as an extension of the quantity theory
to the open economy. It is therefore not surprising to ﬁnd him treating the
exchange rate as a purely monetary phenomenon determined by relative na-
tional money stocks operating through national price levels. “Nothing can
alter the state of the exchange,” he wrote, “that does not alter the state of
prices, and nothing can alter the state of prices, the quantity of produce be-
ing the same, that does not alter the state of currency” (1819, p. 27). In
terms of the quantity theory equations presented above, Wheatley held that
E = P/P∗ = kM/k∗M∗ = K(M/M∗). From this equation derives his conclusion
that “there is no other cause than a relative excess of currency, which makes
the exchange unfavourable” (1819, p. 24). Thus “the course of exchange is the
exclusive criterion of how far the currency of one country is increased beyond
the currency of another” (1803, p. 207).
Wheatley comments at length on key propositions of the doctrine. Regard-
ing causality, he asserts it runs unidirectionally from price levels to exchange
rates. Regarding the transmission mechanism, he posits rational expectations.
He argues that agents, observing price-level changes and anticipating the com-
pensating exchange rate correction, incorporate those anticipations into the
rate and so make them a reality.3 The result is that exchange rates adjust
instantaneously to price levels.4 Regarding deviations from purchasing power
parity, he denies their occurrence. Rational expectations maintain the exchange
rate at parity equilibrium. Therefore, currencies cannot be temporarily over- or
undervalued on the market for foreign exchange. Finally, regarding neutrality,
he argues that because exchange rates are always at parity, their ﬂuctuations
cannot affect real trade balances or the terms of trade in the least. His treatment
of these issues is among the more extreme and uncompromising in the classical
literature.
3 According to Wheatley, the exchange rate attains purchasing power parity equilibrium so
swiftly as to bypass trade-balance effects. Other classical economists, notably Henry Thornton
(1802, p. 198), had suggested that a rise in one country’s prices relative to another’s could only
exercise its self-correcting inﬂuence on the exchange rate through the trade balance. In their view,
a rise in home prices relative to foreign prices would, by spurring imports and checking exports,
cause a trade deﬁcit and a corresponding excess demand for foreign exchange to ﬁnance it. This
excess demand in turn would bid up the exchange rate, thereby equalizing common-currency
price levels. But Wheatley thought such intermediate steps unnecessary. In his view, the exchange
rate adjusts immediately.
4 “But immediately that the prices of one country become relatively higher than the prices
of another, the course of exchange . . . will note the difference, and become unfavourable to the
same extent” (Wheatley 1819, p. 24). “The instant that the variation occurs it is announced by
the exchange, and a credit given in conformity to the difference” (Wheatley 1807, p. 64).       
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Gold Price Arbitrage
Wheatley’s theory of gold arbitrage constitutes the third building block of his
model. It explains how countries eliminate their excess or deﬁcient money
stocks under metallic and convertible currency regimes.
His theory is simplicity itself. It says that arbitrageurs will ship gold from
where its monetary value is low to where its monetary value is high. Com-
parison of ﬁxed domestic and foreign mint prices of gold quoted in a single
currency at the rate of exchange reveals these respective monetary values. Let
a rise in the exchange rate—that is, a depreciation of the home currency rela-
tive to the foreign currency—raise the common-currency value of gold abroad
over its value at home. The result will be to precipitate a specie export. For
arbitrageurs will ﬁnd that they can convert domestic paper into gold at the ﬁxed
mint price, sell the gold abroad at its foreign mint price, convert the proceeds
at the given exchange rate into more domestic currency than they started with,
and thus buy more gold than they had before. They will continue to engage in
this sequence of transactions as long as gold’s geographical value differential
yields arbitrage proﬁts.
At this point, Wheatley introduces transport costs into the analysis. Instead
of abstracting from such costs as in the case of goods, he argues that these costs
are too substantial to neglect in the case of gold. In particular, he estimates that
specie transport costs amount to at least 3 percent of gold’s value. Consequently,
arbitrageurs will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export specie only when the exchange rate
exceeds relative mint prices by more than enough to cover such costs. In
symbols, E > (1 + s)Pg/P∗
g, where Pg and P∗
g are the domestic and foreign
mint prices of gold and s is gold’s shipping cost expressed as a percentage of
the domestic mint price. Rewriting this condition as EP∗
g − Pg > sPg yields
the proﬁtability criterion for gold exports: such exports are proﬁtable when the
foreign-to-domestic gold price differential exceeds the cost of transit. It follows
that “when the exchange becomes unfavourable to...t h eextent of ﬁve, ten,
or ﬁfteen percent, gold will ﬁnd its way out.” For arbitrageurs will reap “as
a proﬁt what remains after the charge of transit, which is . . . three percent”
(1819, pp. 24–25).
Symmetrically, Wheatley argues that gold imports become proﬁtable when
the exchange rate falls below mint par by more than transit costs, or E <
Pg/P∗
g(1 + s). Then the home price of gold exceeds the foreign price by more
than the cost of transit, or Pg − EP∗
g > sEP∗
g. Arbitrageurs, secure that their
proﬁts will not be eaten up by shipping costs, will import gold to realize the
differential. In short, Wheatley speciﬁes certain critical values of the exchange
rate that trigger gold inﬂows and outﬂows. These values of course are the
famous specie points of the trade literature.      
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2. ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
Armed with the foregoing concepts, Wheatley explains how an open econ-
omy adjusts to real and monetary shocks under alternative currency regimes.
According to Wheatley, monetary shocks trigger specie redistributions under
metallic and convertible currency regimes and exchange rate changes under
inconvertible paper regimes. Adjustment ceases and equilibrium reigns when
the common-currency prices of goods and gold are the same worldwide. By
contrast, real shocks prompt changes in real incomes and expenditures but leave
nominal exchange rates and specie ﬂows unchanged. Adjustment ends when
the income and spending changes re-equilibrate the real balance of payments.
In the following paragraphs, it will be useful to consider Wheatley’s analy-
sis of monetary shocks ﬁrst. Such shocks take the form of exogenous increases
in the domestic money stock. He examines the resulting responses in purely
metallic, convertible currency, and inconvertible currency regimes. In all cases,
money’s inﬂuence is conﬁned to nominal variables. No real variables change
except for gold’s relative price EP∗
g/Pg, which moves to its export point.
The Process of Adjustment to Monetary Shocks in a
Purely Metallic Regime
Consider ﬁrst a metallic or 100 percent reserve gold-standard regime. Let an
exogenous increase in the quantity of specie attributable to “the fertility of the
mines” occur in the home country. The monetary expansion produces an imme-
diate, equiproportional rise in the domestic price level. With perfect wage-price
ﬂexibility, nominal wages rise in step with prices, leaving real wages and thus
employment and output unchanged. Here is the ﬁrst strict bullionist or Ricardian
proposition, namely, that money is neutral in its effect on real activity.
Turning to the market for foreign exchange, Wheatley argues that agents
there observe the rise in domestic prices and anticipate the compensating ex-
change rate depreciation. They incorporate those anticipations into the rate,
which depreciates immediately. The resulting equiproportional rise in the price
level and the exchange rate leaves the terms of trade or relative price of goods
at home and abroad, EP∗/P, unchanged. With no terms-of-trade improvement
to induce a trade deﬁcit, none occurs.
Instead, adjustment occurs in the market for monetary gold. Given the ﬁxed
foreign and domestic mint prices of gold, P∗
g and Pg, it follows that the rise in
the exchange rate raises gold’s common-currency price abroad, EP∗
g, above its
price at home, Pg,o rEP∗
g −Pg > 0. Still, the exchange rate may not depreciate
enough to raise the gold price differential EP∗
g − Pg above the cost of transit
sPg. If so, nothing further happens.
But let the exchange rate rise above mint par by more than the cost of
transporting gold and arbitrage becomes proﬁtable. Agents then have an incen-
tive to ship specie abroad to realize the gold price differential. By contracting    
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the domestic money stock and deﬂating the domestic price level, the resulting
loss of specie will restore the exchange rate to mint parity, thus putting a
stop to further gold drains. In this way, the efﬂux of gold will have restored
the natural distribution of specie required for national (and world) monetary
equilibrium. The upshot in Wheatley’s small-open-economy case is that (1) P
and E are the same as before, (2) the specie increment is dispersed abroad
where it is too small to affect the world money stock and world price level,
and (3) P∗ accordingly remains unchanged. Wheatley (1807) summarizes:
“In every instance, therefore, where a relative excess of currency caused the
same sum to measure a less value in one country than it measured in others,
the course of exchange would become unfavourable, and by leading to the
departure and general distribution of the surplus specie, maintain inviolable the
level of money” (pp. 66–67).
Wheatley Versus Hume
Here was a new theory of the adjustment mechanism. It differed from David
Hume’s celebrated account of the price-specie-ﬂow mechanism enunciated in
his 1752 essays “Of Money” and “Of the Balance of Trade.” In his ﬁrst essay,
Hume maintains that increases in the stock of metallic money temporarily
stimulate real activity before raising prices proportionally. Wheatley’s model
permits no such temporary nonneutrality. And in the second essay, Hume im-
plies that the rise in domestic prices produces no fully offsetting rise in the
exchange rate. The result is an increase in the relative price of home to for-
eign goods, which, by rendering imports cheap and exports dear, precipitates a
trade deﬁcit. Wheatley’s model allows no such terms-of-trade or trade-balance
effects.
Moreover, since the exchange rate in Hume’s model is ﬁxed (or at least
remains below the export point), it cannot depreciate sufﬁciently to produce the
gold price differential that triggers specie arbitrage. True, gold moves abroad
in his model to equalize commodity prices. But it does so passively just to
ﬁnance the trade deﬁcit rather than actively in search of a higher price abroad.
Thus, while Hume’s model achieves the same equilibrium distribution
of specie as Wheatley’s model, it does so through a different process. In
short, Hume’s account features exchange rate ﬁxity, terms-of-trade variation,
trade deﬁcits, continuous gold price parity, and no gold arbitrage. By contrast,
Wheatley’s account stresses exchange rate variation, continuous purchasing
power parity, no trade deﬁcits, and temporary gold price differentials that
activate specie arbitrage. Evidently there is more than one classical theory
of the adjustment mechanism.
Adjustment to Monetary Shocks in Convertible Currency Regimes
Wheatley notes that a process similar to that described above works to eliminate
excess money supplies in convertible currency regimes wherein paper is freely      
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convertible into gold at a ﬁxed price upon demand. Now, however, correction
is achieved through retirement of excess notes as well as through specie drains.
Let an exogenous increase in the “publication of state and bank paper”
occur in the home country (1807, p. 60). Money, prices, and the exchange rate
rise equiproportionally maintaining relative prices EP∗/P and the trade balance
unchanged. When the exchange rate depreciates to the point where gold export
becomes proﬁtable, arbitrageurs present paper notes to banks for conversion
into gold at the ofﬁcial mint price. The resulting specie drain obliges banks to
contract the note issue to protect their gold reserves. Such contraction causes
the price deﬂation that restores the exchange rate to mint par and puts a stop to
specie drains.5 Indeed, Wheatley contends that central bankers’ knowledge of
this process disciplined them to contract as soon as the exchange rate signaled
overissue.6
Wheatley also pioneered the distinction between small and large open-
economy models. He was the ﬁrst to point out that a small economy’s excess
issue, being a negligible fraction of the world money stock, could have no per-
ceptible inﬂuence on that stock or world prices. By contrast, a large economy’s
excess issue could affect both. The large economy would, after working off its
excess balances, retain its relative share of the enhanced world money stock
and its price level would be higher than before. By contrast, adjustment would
leave the small economy’s price level unchanged.
In this connection, he also observes that all nations expanding in concert
could do what no single nation could do alone, namely, generate an unlimited
rise in money and prices. “Paper,” he writes, “might be increased in any given
country to any extent, provided that the currency of other nations were aug-
mented in a similar ratio to preserve the equivalency” (1807, p. 28). For if all
countries expanded in step, none would be conscious of an excess of currency.
Although money and prices would rise in each country, there would be no ex-
change rate depreciation, no rise in the market price of gold, no drain of gold
reserves from one country to another to limit expansion. Each country’s paper,
no matter how greatly augmented, would retain its value relative to gold and
to other currencies. Wheatley was the ﬁrst economist to enunciate this point.
5 “When the over-issue of paper made the prices of this country higher than the prices of
others . . . and the course of exchange marked the difference, bullion, which is foreign money
. . . sold at a correspondent premium . . . together with the charges of transit. . . . Bank paper,
therefore, was pressed upon the Bank to be exchanged for guineas, that the guineas might be
converted into bullion, to be . . . sent abroad. By this process, Bank paper was reduced in amount
. . . and . . . its contraction lowered our prices to a level with prices of other countries . . . and
restored the exchange to par” (1819, pp. 39–40).
6 “The unfavourable exchange, which naturally resulted from a partial redundance, consti-
tuted the exclusive check to the issues of the Bank of England throughout the whole of the
preceding century, and prevented the publication of a greater sum than that proportion, which
was adequate to circulate the produce of this country at par with the produce of others” (1807,
pp. 68–69).        
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Adjustment to Monetary Shocks Under Inconvertible Currency Regimes
Wheatley was also among the earliest to analyze the operation of an incon-
vertible paper currency, which he saw as introducing a new twist to his model.
Under inconvertibility, money cannot leak out into foreign trade. An excess
issue cannot be worked off through specie drains as it can under metallic
and convertible currency regimes. Instead, the exchange rate eliminates the
redundant currency by devaluing it in proportion to its excess.
As before, Wheatley begins his analysis by introducing an exogenous mon-
etary disturbance into his model. He assumes the banking system, desiring to
reduce its reserve ratio, injects additional paper notes into an economy initially
in monetary equilibrium with the exchange rate at mint par. He then traces out
the ensuing sequence of events.
As in the convertible currency case, the overissue of inconvertible paper
generates immediate and proportional rises in the prices of goods and foreign
exchange. Together, these increases operate to maintain the real terms of trade
EP∗/P unchanged, thus forestalling trade deﬁcits.
At the same time, the depreciating exchange rate raises gold’s relative price
abroad EP∗
g/Pg. But as long as that increase does not exceed the cost of transit,
gold remains a non-traded good that sells domestically at its unchanged market
(and mint) price.
Let the exchange rate rise by more than the cost of transit, however, and
gold becomes a traded good and therefore subject to the law of one price. As
a result, market and mint price diverge. No longer tied to the mint price by
convertibility, gold now fetches a price equal to its common-currency price
abroad, EP∗
g, minus the cost of transit.7 And since that common-currency price
varies one for one with the exchange rate, it follows that gold commands a
premium over its old mint price equal to the percentage rate of depreciation of
the exchange rate. As this percentage rate is also the rate of expansion of the
money stock, Wheatley arrives at the Ricardian or strict bullionist proposition
that the percentage premium on gold constitutes proof and measure of overissue
under inconvertibility.
The gold premium also prohibits specie exports. For the same law-of-one-
price condition that equalizes gold’s value worldwide precludes arbitrageurs
from making proﬁts on shipping the metal. Wheatley’s (1807, p. 70) exposition
of this point is both seminal and deﬁnitive. Under inconvertibility, arbitrageurs
cannot obtain gold from the central bank. If some coin remains in circulation,
however, they can obtain it from domestic coin holders. To induce the latter
to part with their gold, arbitrageurs must pay the asking price. But coin hold-
ers themselves have the option of shipping their gold abroad, selling it at the
7 In Wheatley’s words, specie annexes a premium and “resiliates to a level with its value
abroad” (1807, p. 367).       
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foreign mint price, and converting the proceeds net of transit cost into domestic
currency at the rate of exchange. Consequently, arbitrageurs must pay a per-
ounce price of Pg = EP∗
g − sPg for domestic gold, to which must be added
the cost of shipping it sPg. But this sum EP∗
g − sPg + sPg leaves no arbitrage
proﬁts to induce gold exports. For it just equals EP∗
g, exactly what gold fetches
abroad.
Since no proﬁts can be made by exporting gold, none is exported. Instead,
exchange rate changes rather than gold drains eliminate excess money stocks.
Exchange depreciation devalues money in proportion to its excess. Such deval-
uation keeps demand-adjusted money stocks everywhere the same, as interna-
tional monetary equilibrium requires. Let k∗M∗ be the foreign demand-adjusted
money stock and kM/E its domestic counterpart measured in terms of a common
currency. Then world monetary equilibrium requires that k∗M∗ = kM/E. Any
excess of kM will be offset by compensating rises in E to maintain the equality.
In Wheatley’s words, “the course of exchange has no other means” of working
off an excess supply of inconvertible currency “than to reduce it to a discount
in proportion to its excess” (1807, p. 69).
In short, Wheatley argues that exchange rates bear the full burden of ad-
justment under inconvertibility. Specie movements do not occur. To explain
why specie does not move, he appeals to the law of one price. He also appeals
to the idea of comparative cost. He argues that inconvertibility renders gold
just another commodity whose price during inﬂation rises identically with all
commodity prices. But identical rises in the prices of goods and gold imply that
gold cannot be cheap in terms of goods. And not being the relatively cheap
commodity, it cannot qualify for exportation on comparative cost grounds.
Therefore it is not exported. For that reason, specie does not move when in-
convertibility reigns. Instead, it leaves adjustment to the exchange rate.
3. ADJUSTMENT TO REAL SHOCKS
Having argued that exchange depreciation, gold price premia, and specie drains
constitute proof and measure of overissue, Wheatley had to show that those
same phenomena could not also arise from real shocks operating through the
balance of payments. For if his monetary variables registered real disturbances
as well as monetary overissue, they could hardly be unambiguous indicators of
the latter alone. Candidate real shocks included domestic crop failures, subsidies
and loans to Britain’s allies in the war against Napoleon, and the expenses of
maintaining troops on the continent. He had to show that these disturbances
propagated their effects through non-monetary channels and could not affect
his monetary variables in the least.
To do so, he posits a demand-shift, income-expenditure mechanism. In the
case of domestic crop failures, he sees adjustment occurring through shifts in        
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reciprocal demands. Jacob Viner explains. Wheatley, he says, insisted that “the
demand of England and the rest of the world for each other’s product would
necessarily so immediately and completely adjust themselves . . . as to result
under both a metallic and an inconvertible paper standard in the maintenance of
equilibrium in the balance of payments without the aid of specie movements,
changes in the relative level of prices in the two areas, or movements of the
exchange rate” (Viner 1937, p. 142).
Let a home harvest failure depress domestic income. Imports, a function
of income, therefore fall. The resulting decline in the foreign country’s ex-
port sales induces it to cut back its purchases from the home country. Home
exports consequently fall to match home imports. The trade balance remains
unchanged, as do the exchange rate and the ratio of national price levels—
provided, of course, that the central bank eradicates that portion of the money
stock rendered redundant by the fall in income. In terms of Marshallian recip-
rocal demand schedules or offer curves, the curves of both nations shift inward
by equal amounts to intersect the unchanged terms-of-trade vector at a smaller
volume of trade. Exchange rate movements and specie ﬂows are not required.
Wheatley uses the same demand-shift, income-adjustment mechanism to
resolve the transfer problem. He argues that foreign remittances—loans and
subsidies to Britain’s allies plus military expenditures abroad—are effected
by a transfer of goods without disturbing price levels, exchange rates, or the
distribution of specie. Causation runs from remittances to incomes to import
demands to the export surplus that transfers the goods. The home government,
say, taxes domestic citizens and gives the proceeds to the foreign country as a
subsidy. The subsidy reduces home income and raises foreign income by equal
amounts. Imports as a function of income fall in the home country and rise
in the foreign country. The result is a home-country export surplus that, if the
propensities to import in the two countries just add up to one as Wheatley as-
sumes, precisely equals the amount of the subsidy.8 Here is Wheatley’s special
case in which income shifts accomplish the goods transfer with no help from
8 By deﬁnition, the home country’s real trade balance B is the difference between its real
exports X and its real imports I,o rB = X−I. Also by deﬁnition, home exports X are the foreign
country’s imports, I∗, so that the trade balance may be expressed as the difference between foreign
and domestic imports, each a function of real national income, or B = I∗(Y∗) − I(Y). Differ-
entiating the trade balance with respect to the subsidy T yields dB/dT = (dI∗/dY∗)(dY∗/dT) −
(dI/dY)(dY/dT). Since Wheatley assumes the recipient’s and the payer’s incomes increase and
decrease, respectively, by the exact amount of the subsidy—that is, dY∗/dT = −dY/dT = 1—the
expression simpliﬁes to dB/dT = (dI∗/dY∗) + (dI/dY), where the right-hand side is the sum of
the marginal propensities to import. If this sum is one, as Wheatley assumes, then dB/dT = 1,
or dB = dT, and the trade balance moves into surplus by exactly the amount of the subsidy.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the subsidy is paid in goods. Hence he concludes that “the superiority of
our exports above imports must nearly correspond with the amount of our foreign expenditure”
(1807, p. 219).       
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monetary variables or the terms of trade.9 Here too is his formulation of the
Ricardian or strict bullionist doctrine that monetary phenomena are invariant
in response to real shocks to the balance of payments.
Wheatley’s income-shift theory differed from the dominant gold-ﬂow,
price-adjustment theory of his contemporaries (see Fetter [1968], pp. 65–69).
They held that real transfers are accomplished through price changes and specie
ﬂows prompted by the initial ﬁnancing of the transfer. Such ﬁnancing requires
the paying country to obtain the recipient country’s currency to make the cash
payment. The resulting increased demand for foreign exchange bids up the
exchange rate. Given national price levels, the rising exchange rate lowers the
relative price of goods P/EP∗ in the paying country, thus spurring its exports
and checking its imports. Net exports get an extra boost when the exchange
rate reaches its specie point and the resulting gold drain and monetary contrac-
tion deﬂate the paying country’s price level. With deﬂation and depreciation
lowering relative prices, the export surplus expands to effect the transfer in
goods.
The view that transfers operate through monetary variables was, of course,
anathema to Wheatley, who omits such channels from his model. Transfers were
real phenomena. As such, they were entirely independent of monetary phenom-
ena. To dramatize this independence, Wheatley argued that even as the paying
country was making massive unilateral transfers abroad, it could still enforce
specie inﬂows to any extent simply by contracting paper issues and deﬂating
prices until the exchange rate fell to its import point.10 Foreign payments, in
other words, had nothing to do with exchange rates and specie ﬂows.
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF WHEATLEY’S WORK
Although Wheatley’s analysis was primarily theoretical, it had some practical
policy implications.11 First, exchange rates, gold prices, and specie movements
offer infallible indicators of overissue. When they signal monetary excess, it
must be occurring since they respond to nothing else. Their invariance to real
disturbances means that such disturbances cannot distort their signal and render
it ambiguous.
A second implication is that persistent inﬂation is less likely to occur in
convertible than in inconvertible currency regimes. Under convertibility, in-
ﬂation is self-correcting. It automatically precipitates gold drains and forces
9 “Foreign payments . . . have no effect to alter the state of our currency, they have no effect
to alter the state of the exchange” (1819, p. 29).
10 “A due compression of our paper circulation would have led to its [gold’s] inﬂux at the
very moment, that the loan was in payment, and would have glutted the country with specie”
(1807, p. 193).
11 On Wheatley’s policy views, see Fetter (1942), pp. 368–74.       
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banks to contract their note issue to protect their gold reserves. The resulting
shrinkage of the money stock ends the inﬂation. No such corrective drains
occur under inconvertibility when gold, if available at all, commands a price
that renders specie exports unproﬁtable. It follows that convertibility offers the
stronger safeguard to overissue.
A third implication of Wheatley’s work is that price-level stability can be
achieved by monetary means. A staunch advocate of such stability, Wheatley
stressed the evils of price ﬂuctuations. They arbitrarily redistributed income and
wealth among the social classes and provoked social discontent. Avoiding such
evils meant removing their monetary causes. To this end, Wheatley advocated
(1) ending the suspension of specie payments and restoring convertibility of the
British pound, (2) eliminating small notes which he saw as the most unstable
component of the money supply, and (3) removing the note-issuing privilege
from competing private banks and lodging it with the Bank of England.12 These
reforms, he thought, would prevent or minimize sharp variations in the money
stock that constituted the primary obstacle to price stability.
A fourth implication of Wheatley’s work is that indexation can immunize
real payments from unanticipated movements in nominal ones. In this connec-
tion, he proposed price-level indexation of long-term contracts to compensate
for ﬂuctuations in the value of money. “Some criterion,” he said, “should be
assumed for the purpose of providing a graduated scale of the value of money”
so that nominal incomes could be adjusted “in conformity to the result.” Of
the candidate criteria, a general price-index series such as that constructed by
Sir George Shuckburgh Evelyn would be “the least objectionable” (1807, pp.
328–29). Earlier writers had advocated stabilizing real incomes by adjusting
nominal incomes according to changes in the price of a single commodity such
as rye or corn. But Wheatley was the ﬁrst to recommend a general price-level
index number for that purpose. The modern notion of indexation originates
with him.
5. WHEATLEY’S PLACE IN CLASSICAL
MONETARY THOUGHT
Even at its best, Wheatley’s Essay on the Theory of Money could hardly match
the subtlety and insight of Henry Thornton’s Paper Credit of Great Britain. Nor
could it match the power, brilliance, and lucidity of David Ricardo’s High Price
of Bullion. Still, if originality is any criterion, Wheatley’s name belongs in the
12 Unlike other bullionists, Wheatley was unwilling to exonerate private banks from over-
issue. By perversely varying their reserve ratios, such banks overissued notes independently of
the central bank. He denied that the Bank of England controlled such banks through their reserves
or that overissue was prevented by the operation of an interregional price-specie-ﬂow mechanism.  
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front rank of classical monetary theorists. He formulated the strict bullionist
model, which dichotomizes real and monetary sectors and posits neutrality and
exogeneity in the short run as well as the long. True, this model looks primitive
compared to Thornton’s sophisticated schema. But its ultra-simplicity entails
certain positive strengths. The model yields clear-cut policy conclusions. And
it avoids confusion between real and nominal variables. It emphasizes money’s
permanent price effects but ignores transitory output and employment effects
that might distract the central bank from pursuing its primary goal of price
stability. Ricardo, for one, found these properties desirable. He employed a
version of the strict bullionist model after Wheatley ﬁrst presented it.
Nor should Wheatley’s other contributions go overlooked. He established,
three years before Ricardo, the theoretical underpinnings of the Ricardian deﬁ-
nition of excess (see O’Brien [1975], p. 148). This deﬁnition says that if (1) the
exchange rate is depreciated, (2) gold is selling at a premium, and (3) specie
(under convertibility) is leaving the country, then the currency is by deﬁnition
excessive and must be contracted. Here was the tool strict bullionists needed.
With it they could counter antibullionists’ and moderate bullionists’ claims
that such phenomena might well originate in real shocks so that monetary
contraction was not required.
Beyond these ideas were his speciﬁc contributions to international mon-
etary theory. He presented the clearest and most complete statement of the
purchasing power parity doctrine before Gustav Cassel. He was the ﬁrst to
use the rational expectations argument to explain why the terms of trade
is always in equilibrium. He originated the distinction between large- and
small-open-economy models in which a large country’s note issue perceptibly
inﬂuences world money and prices whereas a small country’s issue does not.
Likewise, he introduced the notion that all nations expanding in step in a
convertible currency regime can do what no single nation can do alone, namely,
generate an unlimited rise in money and prices. And his demand-shift, income-
expenditure theory of unilateral transfers anticipated the subsequent contri-
butions of Mountifort Longﬁeld, J. E. Cairnes, C. F. Bastable, J. S. Nicholson,
and Bertil Ohlin.
Perhaps his most outstanding contribution, however, was his speciﬁcation
of the link between exchange rates, gold prices, and gold ﬂows. In an explana-
tion superior to any before Ricardo, he showed that in metallic and convertible
currency regimes gold is not simply a means of discharging international pay-
ments. Rather it is a commodity that ﬂows across nations to capture arbitrage
proﬁts created when exchange rate movements generate gold price differentials.
A related contribution was his use of the law of one price to show that gold
ceases to move across nations when its common-currency value is equalized
worldwide such that no arbitrage proﬁt can be realized by shipping it. He
showed that money’s purchasing power parity over gold, not its purchasing
power parity over goods, is what halts gold movements. These contributions,    
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together with his indexation proposal, were the products of an original mind.
They identify Wheatley as a creative scientiﬁc economist who deserves a
prominent rank in the classical pantheon. Above all, his ideas identify him
as the most monetarist, or strictly quantity theoretic, of all the classical writers.
Wheatley took three key ideas—(1) the quantity theory of money, (2) the
purchasing power parity doctrine, and (3) the notion of gold arbitrage—and
endowed them with sharp analytical content. He then combined these con-
cepts into a powerful framework capable of tracing the effects of monetary
disturbances produced by England’s suspension of convertibility during the
Napoleonic Wars. To analyze the effects of real disturbances produced by the
wars, he developed a separate demand-shift, income-expenditure mechanism.
His achievements merit recognition from economists today.
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